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Adelphi University 
It pays to recall that [Foucault] presents [biopower] in the context of a 
critique of the thematic of sexual repression and liberation. Foucault’s aim 
was to counter a Freudo-Marxist type of discourse, to show how a certain 
idea of ‘the politics of life’ rests on misrecognizing the way in which power 
is exercised over life and its ‘liberation’. It is a paradoxical thing to want 
to invert Foucault’s polemical dispositif in order to assert the vitalist 
rootedness of politics.  
         --Jacques Rancière 1 
Michel Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 
1978-1979 supports Rancère’s interpretation2 but a bridge still needs to be 
built between the appropriate place of life in Foucault and his critique of 
Freud. I suggest that this gap in Foucault’s theory on bio-power can be 
closed by tracing the influence of Georges Canguilhem, his dissertation 
director.  According to Foucault, Canguilhem’s work is the key to 
understanding everything from psychoanalysis to Marxism because it 
examines “the relation between science of life and vitalism.”3 Canguilhem’s 
analysis shows how life sciences develop within a culture that subscribes to 
the notion that the “speaking true” about life is possible.4  He, of course, 
resists this philosophy by asserting that neither physiology nor biology can 
determine norms about life. That falls within the sphere of politics.5 Foucault 
builds on Canguilhem’s ideas and explores, as Rancière notes, how politics 
produces certain “truths” about life. Foucauldian biopolitics examines how 
modern systems of government endorse particular truths about life because 
they work to control and regulate the population.  
If the speaking true about life is called into question, then so is the 
talking cure. The truth will not set you free.  It is, rather, a means to control 
the lives of individuals and the population at large. The focus on the 
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regulation of life marks Foucault’s departure from the two main forms of 
attack against Freud. One employs the phallocentric charge, as French 
feminists from Simone De Beauvoir to Luce Irigaray have done, to criticize 
psychoanalysis.6 While agreeing that Freud’s model makes female sexual 
pleasure a problem, Foucault’s critique of Freud does not highlight the 
privilege of the male so much as the privilege of life that is integral to 
Foucault’s conception of bio-power. Profiles of the frigid wife, the woman 
with a masculinity complex, and even the normal woman provide examples 
of male bias as much as Foucault’s notion of bio-power. Keeping women in a 
constant and almost impossible battle for normalcy in their daily lives is a 
greater display of power than the old model of sovereign power that evinces 
power through death. The Foucauldian critique of psychoanalysis also 
differs from the pseudo-science charge—such as the one offered by his 
mentor, Georges Canguilhem, that psychoanalysis does not meet the rigors 
of genuine science.7 Foucault’s work, in contrast, allows us to see what is at 
stake when people argue about whether psychoanalysis is a science or not. 
The questions Foucault draws out are:  Why is it important to be considered 
a science in modern society? Why is scientific truth so valuable?8 Foucault’s 
answers to these questions are tied to bio-power. The “truth” of science is 
privileged because it effectively disseminates specific norms about the body, 
which help to regulate the individual and the population at large. For 
Foucault, then, science obscures its own creation of norms by making them 
seem to be natural truths.  
Foucault’s History of Science: Revisiting Canguilhem 
The commentary on Foucault’s attitude towards sexual practices—the 
subject matter at the center of, arguably, his most famous work—tends to 
focus on his personal biography and ranges from Arnold Davidson who 
remembers that Foucault thought sex was actually quite boring9 to Mark 
Poster who seems to hint that this interest is in part fueled by a similarity 
between his own sexual lifestyle and that of the Greeks.10 Much less 
attention is paid, however, to the role that science plays within his work. To 
understand Foucault’s reflection on the science of sexuality, it is necessary to 
return to the influence of his mentor, Georges Canguilhem.11  
Foucault’s project exhibits the telltale signs of an outgrowth from his 
teacher’s work. As with any good pupil, the influence of his teacher can be 
seen even as he strives to carve out a place for himself. I will show that 
Foucault’s thesis about bio-power borrows many elements from Canguilhem 
while reaching an important and different conclusion. Foucault gained a 
biological history of the normal in contrast with the abnormal and the 
emergence of the concept “pathological” from Canguilhem. Furthermore, 
they both argue that the normal is identified with life. While Canguilhem 
fights for a scientific discourse that defines norms in relation to life, Foucault 
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suggests that defining norms in relation to life works in conjunction with 
bio-power.  
In the Normal and the Pathological, Canguilhem explained that before the 
discovery of biological error, the normal and the abnormal were thought to 
be two different states with porous boundaries. Disease was the measuring 
stick for the healthy.12 Those who were healthy could only recognize it in 
contrast to unhealthy states that they saw in others or experienced in 
themselves. The emergence of the concept of biological error positioned the 
normal as opposite and wholly other to the pathological. One who is 
abnormal cannot tolerate disease.13 In contrast, the abnormal were defined as 
essentially defective. Those who are truly diseased are not just in a 
momentary lapse of illness but have an endemic flaw. They are pathological.  
Canguilhem could foresee the dangers associated with the latter view. 
Fearing that the efforts to “help” those with biological errors would devolve 
into a genetic inquisition, he gave an account that would be echoed by 
Foucault. Canguilhem states: “At the beginning of this dream we have the 
generous ambition to spare innocent and impotent living beings the 
atrocious burden of producing errors of life. At the end there are the gene 
police, clad in the geneticists’ science.”14 He mounted a resistance to this 
nightmare scenario by suggesting that life should set the standards for 
normalcy, proposing, instead, that normal and healthy should be thought in 
terms of the ability to adapt to the changing conditions in the environment 
or, in short, life. He believed that: 
[F]or the living being life is not a monotonous deduction, a 
rectilinear movement, it ignores geometrical rigidity, it is 
discussion or explanation (what Goldstein calls 
Auseinandersetzung) with an environment where there are 
leaks, holes, escapes and unexpected resistances.15 
Even if someone does not have, for example, two kidneys16, this does 
not mean that she should be considered abnormal. She does have to be more 
diligent about the health of her remaining kidney than those who have two. 
However, if she is able to survive within her environment, Canguilhem 
believes that she should be considered normal so long as her state of health 
does not prohibit her from adapting to her environment. It is her ability to 
overcome the conditions that might put her health in danger and still live 
that make her normal. Furthermore, Canguilhem points out the terrible 
consequences of trying to eliminate biological error while suggesting that 
even those who do not have perfect health should be allowed to live. 
 Foucault develops his premise of bio-power in contrast with the “right 
to take life or let live.”17 Through bio-power, he argues that there has been a 
shift in how people are subjected to power. The full force of power was once 
shown by taking someone’s life, but now, power is more effective and 
forceful by letting people live. In so doing, she could be continually subject 
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to the power with the help of normalizing structures. As Foucault states in 
The Abnormal, “The unlimited etiological power of sexuality at the level of 
the body and illness is one of the most constant themes not only in the texts 
of this new medical ethics but also in the most serious works of 
pathology.”18 Foucault did not believe, unlike Canguilhem, that the gene 
police—with their ability to exterminate life—were the ones invested with 
the most power over life.  Life can be more effectively and thoroughly 
controlled and regulated by norms that were sanctioned by qualified experts 
with scientific backgrounds. According to Foucault, it is precisely because 
normalcy is synonymous with sustaining life that police of all stripes are 
integrated within the state and our everyday lives.19 While Canguilhem 
worried about the possible deductive power that would be expressed by not 
letting the abnormal live, Foucault turned his attention to the ways in which 
normalizing power relied upon the decree to let live. The normalizing police 
could be clad as geneticists, biologists, or psychoanalysts—all sorts of 
scientists. 
To Foucault, all these scientists had at least one thing in common. They 
sought to locate the normal and the pathological. Once that was done, one 
could be made ever more aware of one’s relationship to the normal. Foucault 
seems to suggest that the gap between the normal and abnormal was no less 
wide with psychoanalysis than with genetics of biology. What distinguishes 
Canguilhem from his famous pupil is that he does not think that the normal 
and the pathological are strictly cultural or scientific categories. Canguilhem 
makes use of value-orientation (normativité) within his work while Foucault 
follows his suspicions around the normative to critique human sciences.20 In 
other words, Canguilhem maintains that there are both cultural and 
scientific norms. Foucault’s theories, on the other hand, assert that norms are 
dictated by society and those culturally created norms use science to support 
them. While Canguilhem believed that science could reveal truths divorced 
from the forces of society, Foucault maintains that these norms can be traced 
back to instantiations of truth that support particular power structures.  
Their different approaches to science become clearer when looking at 
their particular views of psychoanalysis.  Despite being critical of 
psychoanalysis, Foucault did not reproach it for being less than any other 
science. Foucault could even be interpreted as suggesting that 
psychoanalysis worked to make Canguilhem’s nightmare less viable and 
necessary. It seems that Foucault was more willing to give Freud credit for at 
least suggesting another way to conceptualize the normal and abnormal. 
Although Freud does not break with normalizing structures, his vision 
responded to the concept of biological error by giving an alternative means 
to help the sick than what Canguilhem thought would be proposed. Alan 
Milchman and Alan Rosenberg note: 
In breaking the link between pathology and heredity, in 
asserting that the division between the normal and the 
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abnormal was not biological, and that it ran through each 
individual, in its conception of the unconscious, which 
challenged the claim of consciousness to be the essence of 
our human being, psychoanalysis had a liberating role to 
play at its inception.21 
Psychoanalysis did offer another way of thinking and a more palatable 
method of dealing with the abnormal than what might be suggested by 
biologists. 
Foucault understood how psychoanalysis could be considered a 
valuable discourse while still finding the need to question the discipline. 
This attitude falls in line with the notion that all scientific truth carried along 
with it hidden dangers, whether they came from psychoanalysis or another 
field of science. I suggest, however, that Canguilhem was a much harsher 
critic of psychoanalysis because he believed in the possible—not 
guaranteed—objectivity of science. Nikolas Rose explains that: “Georges 
Canguilhem … argued that scientific knowledges may not be true, but they 
were truthful, veridical, that is to say they were internally organized around 
a norm of truth and error, and through a constant attention to the issue of 
error, they subjected themselves to critical correction.”22 In a sense, science 
for Canguilhem could be objective about itself. The construction of science 
allowed room for error while building mechanisms to recognize and correct 
it. 
Canguilhem deemed psychoanalysis, on the other hand, to be without 
methods for determining truth or error because it dealt with unstable 
material and produced questionable results. I should note that Canguilhem 
did not see a methodological distinction between areas of psychology. He 
states that: “In spite of appearances, it is by object rather than its method 
that psychology is called clinical, psychoanalytic, social, and ethnological. 
All these adjectives are indicative of a single and same object of study: Man, 
talkative or taciturn, sociable or unsociable.”23 Therefore, when he makes 
remarks against psychology, he does the same for psychoanalysis as part of 
a group of “knowledges that the French tend to call simply ‘psy’.”24 
Canguilhem adds: 
In fact, in many works of psychology, one gets the 
impression that they are a mix of a philosophy without 
rigor, an ethics without exigency, and a medicine without 
control; philosophy without rigor, because psychology is 
eclectic in the pretext of objectivity; an ethics without 
exigency, because psychology makes an uncritical 
correspondence between ethnological experiments and the 
confessor, the educator, the chief, the judge, etc; a 
medicine without control, since it studies the three most 
unintelligible and the least curable sorts of illnesses—
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illnesses of the skin, of the nerves, and of the mental—the 
last two have always supplied psychology its observation 
and hypotheses. 25 
Canguilhem doubts if psychology and psychoanalysis can be objective about 
itself or its research. Hence, he doubts their credibility. Because their data 
come from the most precarious objects for study, he seems unwilling to 
grant them the same type of merit he is able to grant other scientists. Only 
those who can maintain high standards of investigation and information 
gathering will be bestowed with the label of “science.” And he seems to 
intimate that no field of psychology can pass muster. 
 Foucault uses a different angle to undermine psychoanalysis. Because 
he was aware that many in the profession believed that psychiatry could be 
objective and scientific credible,26 he attacked the grounds of science. In an 
ambivalent move that could be read as both affirming or denying the merits 
of psychoanalysis,27 Foucault recognizes how psychoanalysis is made to be 
level with other sciences. The rise of psychiatric power means that “… the 
doctor is competent, he knows the diseases and the patients, he possesses a 
scientific knowledge which is of the same type as that of the chemist or the 
biologist…”28 This could either mean that it should be given the same status 
as other sciences or that all sciences were suspect.  Of course, the two are not 
mutually exclusive. Rose names thinkers such as Canguilhem who would 
reject the equation of psychoanalysis with science, but he also gives 
justifications for the unfounded inferiority of psychoanalysis among 
sciences. He suggests that “scientists seek to conjure up in reality—through 
their observations, measurements, inscriptions and so forth, the things they 
have already made conjured up in thought—in their concepts, theories and 
explanatory forms.”29 Scientists of all varieties labor to reaffirm their ideas 
through their experiments. The ideas come first. Studies are motivated by 
the scientists’ desire to realize their preconceived ideas. The purpose of the 
investigations is to prove those ideas right. Freud may diagnose his patients 
according to his own predetermined philosophy but this is not so different 
from other scientific theories. 
Further evidence that the gulf of objectivity which separates psychiatry 
from other sciences does not exist, Foucault states: 
If we wanted to analyze the profound structures of 
objectivity in the knowledge and practice of nineteenth-
century psychiatry from Pinel to Freud …, we should have 
to show in fact that such objectivity was from the start a 
reification of a magical nature, which could only be 
accomplished with the complicity of the patient himself, 
and beginning from a transparent and clear moral 
practice, gradually forgotten as positivism imposed its 
myths of scientific objectivity.30 
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Objectivity is nothing more than the patient’s willingness to accept that the 
doctor has more knowledge than the patient and, therefore, knows the right 
course of action to take. Being placed in the position of authority by the 
patient gives the doctor and the theories prescribed an appearance of 
objectivity. I suggest that this is as much the case with other sciences as it is 
with psychiatry. In many cases, the patient simply takes the medicine that is 
prescribed by the doctor without questioning what the medication is. More 
to the point, in doing this, the patient does not question the doctor. The 
doctor is allowed to assume control over the patient’s body. Stated 
otherwise, a power relationship manifests between doctor and patient.31 This 
partnership, for Foucault, is indicative of how power hinges on life. Patients 
listen to the advice of doctors because they think their lives depend upon it. 
As Milchman and Rosenberg explain, bio-power functions in two main 
ways. “In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, according to 
Foucault, bio-power will assume the form of … a bio-politics of populations, 
and become the hallmark of the power relations that shape the 
contemporary world.”32 I will now focus on how bio-politics informed not 
only psychoanalysis but also biology. Foucault describes biopolitics as being 
“… focused on the species body, the body imbued with the mechanics of life 
and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, births and 
mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the 
conditions that can cause these to vary.”33 In order to argue that life is 
privileged, Foucault needs to find an emerging pattern; and he does in the 
sciences. It is as follows. Locate the normal and the pathological. Let the 
abnormal live and heighten awareness of it. Foucault saw that 
psychoanalysis executed this plan just as well as biology. So when Freud 
appeals to anatomical science for support of his own theories, he inevitably 
finds it because both sciences operate as part of bio-power. They depend on 
what Dianna Taylor calls “normalizing norms.”34  
To understand how the conceptual formation of sexuality in 
psychoanalysis uses biology as a crutch, I will give a summary of the 
thoughts of the thinker who Foucault targets—Sigmund Freud. Despite 
Dreyfus and Rabinow’s remarks that “Foucault points out that particularly 
in its early days, whatever its normalizing function later on, psychoanalysis 
demonstrated a persistent and courageous resistance to all theories of 
hereditary degeneracy,”35 I argue that Freud still depends upon a 
normalized body to make his theories of sexuality work. Showing the 
limitations of dealing with sexual pathology from a biological point of view 
enables Freud to suggest that psychoanalysis has something to offer in terms 
of study and treatment. However, he does not dismiss biology as irrelevant. 
Psychoanalysis presents a different ‘solution’ to pathology—or means to 
normalize—but it continues to use anatomy as the starting point of the 
“problem.” Although Freud claims in “Femininity” that anatomical science 
cannot give us a clear distinction between the two sexes because humans 
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have both male and female apparatus in varying degrees,36 his 
understanding of pathologies particular to women is connected to the 
biologically-determined body. But Freud claims that there is a psychological 
reaction to anatomy that reveals a difference between the formation of men 
and women. “The discovery that she is castrated is a turning-point in a girl’s 
growth.”37 Freud further explains that “the castration complex is … started 
by the sight of genitals of the other sex. They at once notice the difference 
and, it must be admitted, its significance too.”38 When she sees that little 
boys have penises, the little girl is struck with a sense of inferiority because 
she is lacking something that is present in another. 
Because bio-power is constituted by a network of normalizing 
structures, psychoanalysis and biology are not only connected to each other. 
Laying out Freud’s foundation for a psychoanalytic diagnosis of women not 
only has ramifications for biology but also for the family structure. 39 
Although it is not terribly original to lambaste psychoanalysis “…for giving 
… sexuality a particular form and for valorizing in its theory one particular 
type of domestic arrangement: Daddy, Mummy and baby,”40 what I will 
show later is that Foucault’s theories draw a connection between the family 
and bio-power as well—revealing the expansiveness of the network of 
power. Freud’s use of biology leads to a discussion of the family. Freud first 
locates family trouble between the daughter and the mother. She blames her 
mother for having castrated her and placed her in a disadvantageous 
position.41 But when she slowly realizes that her mother, too, is without a 
penis, she begins to have even stronger feelings of hostility towards her 
mother. Furthermore, this hostile relationship between daughter and mother 
often continues until the woman is able to produce a penis of her own in the 
form of a baby boy.42 Because women have never been able to overcome 
their penis-envy, their wish can only be fulfilled when they give birth to a 
baby boy. The baby boy represents the ability of the woman to not only have 
but create a penis herself while at the same time opening up a relationship, 
which was once troubled, with her own mother. 
Her abnormal relationship with her father can also be traced back to the 
lack of a penis. The pre-Oedipal stage (attachment to the mother) that little 
girls go through on their way to the Oedipus stage (attachment to the parent 
of the opposite sex, which is the father for the little girl) is a major difference 
that contributes to the pathological feelings women have towards their 
fathers.43 This inappropriate intimacy a woman feels toward her father as a 
result of the Oedipus complex also manifests itself through seduction 
fantasies. Freud reports: 
In the period in which the main interest was directed to discovering 
infantile sexual traumas, almost all my women patients told me that they 
had been seduced by their father. I was driven to recognize in the end that 
these reports were untrue and … are derived from phantasies and not from 
real occurrences. It was only later that I was able to recognize in this 
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phantasy of being seduced by the father the expression of the typical 
Oedipus complex in women.44 
The female version of the Oedipus complex translates into a memory of 
being seduced by her father. As a woman, she realizes that a sexual 
relationship with her father is taboo but because she has never been able to 
exit the Oedipus stage, she is not able to move past these imagined scenes 
lodged in her memory. They are never fully resolved because the woman, 
lacking a penis, has no impetus to leave the Oedipus stage. 
 These diagnoses together give a sketch of how easily a little girl can 
develop tensions with her parents because of her anatomy. Yet Freud does 
hold out hope that a little girl can turn into a “normal” woman, as difficult 
as the battle may be. She may still learn how to carve out a space for herself 
within her own family. While Freud’s logic concludes that the construction 
of a family stems from an acceptance of her sex, Foucault will argue that 
these instructions come from a family unit that is constituted through bio-
power. 
 But even after his analysis of the importance of the sexual organs in 
forming sexuality (both normal and pathological), Freud does consider the 
inverse possibility. He concedes that children could learn how to choose the 
correct partner by observing the interaction of their parents. In other words, 
they could arrive at normalcy by mimicking what happens within their 
families: 
We might suppose in addition that in this [attraction to the 
opposite sex] the children are following the pointer given 
them by the sexual preference of their parents.  But we are 
not going to find things so easy; we scarcely know 
whether we are to believe seriously in the power of which 
poets talk so much and with such enthusiasm but which 
cannot be further dissected analytically.45 
Freud only briefly entertains this claim but it is precisely this inverse 
argument that Foucault will use to challenge him. 
Foucault’s Problematization of Freud’s Female Sexuality 
If Freud could be persuaded to entertain the idea that sexuality is 
influenced not only by biology but also the family unit, perhaps there is a 
gateway to revealing another, even greater force behind our understanding 
of sex; one that can encapsulate them all. As Deleuze and Guattari note “… 
the familial determinations become the applications of the social 
axiomatic.”46 Familial relationships inform other social structures, of which 
science is one. “Everything is reduced to the father-mother-child 
triangle…”47 And the continued resonance that familial relationships have 
within society is due to the correlations with bio-power. The proposed 
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concept of sex goes full circle as it reinforces the ideal of the family—sex is a 
tool for procreation alone. This type of reasoning works towards 
propagation, which is central to bio-politics. 
Unlike Freud, Foucault does not attach an immediate significance to the 
little boy’s sex, the penis. Our understanding of our sex comes after we learn 
about sexuality through the family structure. But the steadiness of this 
family structure did not occur by happenstance. He claims that the 
traditional family unit is supported because it has the power to shape our 
concepts of sex and reproduce the family unit. In other words, it is shaped 
by norms and is part of the matrix of power that perpetuates sexual norms 
with the aim of regulating both the individual and the population. He sees 
how generation after generation, the family instills a belief that there is a 
function of sex from which we should not deviate. Simply put, these norms 
are not created.  They are a given. We are convinced that something 
greater—biology, Nature, God—has determined the purpose of our sex and 
the structure that is built around it. In other words, our sexual organs are 
already laden with purpose. The theory that Foucault challenges is that the 
family organically arises from the purpose of sex; and therefore, sex 
functions as the foundation of the traditional family. Foucault, to the 
contrary, demonstrates that psychoanalysis does not question the formation 
of the family because to do so would also lead to the unraveling of 
psychoanalysis. Deleuze and Guattari state that: “This is what Foucault has 
shown in his very fine analysis: the familialism inherent in psychoanalysis 
doesn’t so much destroy classical psychiatry as shine forth as the latter’s 
crowning achievement.”48 If the traditional family structure stays intact, so 
does the foundation of psychoanalysis. 
 Foucault resisted the notion that sexual organs were the point of 
departure for the development of sexuality. Instead, he states: 
It is precisely this idea of sex in itself that we cannot accept 
without examination. Is ‘sex’ really the anchorage point 
that supports the manifestations of sexuality, or is it not 
rather a complex idea that was formed inside the 
deployment of sexuality? In any case, one could show 
how this idea of sex took form in the different strategies of 
power and the definite role it played therein.49 
If, for Freud, the knowledge of one’s sex is necessary to understand one’s 
sexuality, then Foucault would argue that sex is inscribed within a discourse 
of sexuality. Rather than accepting that our sexual organs are necessarily 
attached to their functional value, he asks us to divorce an analysis of 
sexuality from anatomy, for example. In other words, he wants to challenge 
the primacy of sexual functions. He anticipated that others would object to 
his insistence that sex could find meaning from another source besides 
anatomical purposes. To them, this would be a sexuality that was devoid of 
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a sex.50 Although he understood that most would assign sexuality (that of a 
man, that of a woman) depending on what sexual organ one had, he 
believed that the codified sexuality was imposed on sex. Foucault believes 
that one can have an understanding of not only sexuality but of one’s role 
within the established family unit before having any real knowledge of one’s 
sexual organs or their functions. He further adds that it is the pressure to 
conform to familial ideals that gives credence to pathologies attributed to 
women. 
Foucault will also attack sex in itself as being too simplistic. For him, sex 
is constructed to have multiple meanings that reinforce strategies of power 
aimed at reproduction, which reinforces the power of the family unit that, in 
turn, helps the proliferation of the population. He will argue that any 
understanding of sex that strays from the aims of the family will be labeled 
pathological. On the outskirts of this normal concept of sex lies pleasure as a 
value of sex:51 
Thus, in the process of hysterization of women, ‘sex’ was 
defined in three ways; as that which belongs in common 
to men and women; as that which belongs, par excellence, 
to men, and hence is lacking in women; but at the same 
time, as that which by itself constitutes woman’s body, 
ordering it wholly in terms of the functions of 
reproduction and keeping it in constant agitation through 
the effects of that very function.52 
Depending upon which pathology, the label assigned to a woman would 
change but two things would remain constant. Women are expected to deny 
pleasure and have procreation as the main function of their sex. This, in 
turn, reproduces the family unit that had taught them how their sex was 
supposed to function according to biology. The three definitions of sex given 
by Foucault correspond with the three possible outcomes for women as 
analyzed by Freud. I will begin with the latter two examples because the 
naming of the pathologies is directly related to one or both of the standards 
set for women. After establishing how both the sexually frigid woman and 
the woman with a masculinity complex stray from the norm, I will show 
why Foucault believes that even the normal woman is not free from this 
process of hysterization. She, too, must constantly be on the watch for signs 
that her sex will slip into an abnormal one. How could she be allowed to 
escape it when the fate of the traditional family and the human species 
hangs in the balance? 
Surely, Foucault drew on Freud’s description of the frigid woman when 
he referenced the diagnosis for a woman who feels no pleasure during 
sexual intercourse. Sexual frigidity corresponds to sex as something that 
belongs only to men. The frigid wife does not desire sex because it is 
somehow missing within women. Freud states that “the aim of biology has 
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been entrusted to the aggressiveness of men and has been made to some 
extent independent of women’s consent.”53 I believe it is not out of line with 
Foucault to interpret this as an argument that attributes sex to men and 
lacking within women. Women are seen as without sex, in this case, because 
biology has ensured procreation through the male, not the female. Even if 
the woman is deficient in regards to sex, nature has sufficiently enabled the 
continuation of the species by planting sex within man. Freud further states 
that sexual frigidity of women, although not fully understood, may be a 
psychological problem and therefore, could be susceptible to positive 
influence. But it is also possible that this condition is rooted in anatomical 
factors.54 Sexual frigidity may or may not be rooted in her sex but it is clearly 
not something normal. It is either the pathology of the mind or of the body. 
Freud seems to suggest that if it is a physical problem, he can offer no aid. 
But luckily, he does believe that there is possibly another approach. If it is a 
mental pathology, there could be hope of a resolution with the help of 
psychoanalysis. Even Foucault recognized that “psychoanalysis was 
established in opposition to a certain kind of psychiatry, the psychiatry of 
degeneracy, eugenics and heredity.”55 If it is an abnormality of the body, it 
seems that she may have to accept that the desires of the male are normal 
and ordered by Nature—whether she likes it or not. In other words, she 
must submit to the procreative act for the good of the species despite not 
having any urge to do so. 
On the other hand, a woman who does experience sexual pleasure also 
suffers from a sexual pathology. Foucault uses Freud’s diagnosis of the 
masculinity complex to show how woman’s sex is tied not to sexual 
enjoyment but to the function of reproduction that belongs to the truly 
female sex—the vagina. Because the clitoris is merely an atrophied form of 
the male penis, the pleasure that is derived from it is not a feminine one. The 
clitoris is a male apparatus that just happens to appear in women’s bodies.56 
A woman with a masculinity complex refuses to embrace her womanhood 
and wrongly clings to the pleasure derived from the clitoris. When a girl 
refuses to face the fact that she will not receive a penis, she takes refuge in 
her phallic mother or father and increases in clitoridal activity, which is 
ordinarily a male characteristic.57 One could read Frued as stating that a 
woman must relent from pleasuring herself through the clitoris. She must 
accept that her sex is attached to the vagina, which does not feel pleasure (or 
at least Freud does not discuss the pleasure associated with the vagina). Her 
sexual health is tied to the reproduction of the species.  In continuing with 
clitoridal activity, she denies her womanhood. The masculinity complex 
describes a woman who rejects that her sex is defined by and through the 
vagina as a site to conceive, bear, and deliver a child. For Freud, she who 
does not wholly accept this definition of the female sex also rejects what it 
means to be a woman. 
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Freud’s version of normal femininity can be achieved if too much sexual 
desire is not lost while repressing clitoridal activity. She, then, accepts the 
fact that she will never be given a penis from her father and replaces her 
desire for a penis with the desire for a baby that she will make with her 
husband.58 This may constitute normalcy for Freud but Foucault still 
considers this part of the process of the hysterization of women. For those 
who “would argue that it is entirely possible to have therapy that does not 
normalize—for example ending in female clients getting married and having 
a baby,”59 Foucault would disagree. Normalizing powers, in this case, are 
directed towards the end of having a baby. Even though this case allows sex 
to belong to both men and women, Foucault argues that this proper form of 
femininity works to link the sex of woman to its reproductive function. 
Desire for and enjoyment of sex belongs to the man. The woman should 
desire and enjoy sex only insofar as she seeks to create a child, if she is 
normal. She should not enjoy the sex act itself because the activity is located 
in the unfeeling vagina, the true sex of the woman. On the other hand, she 
can feel excitement about the prospect of producing a baby. In other words, 
the pleasure is not sexual. A woman is only normal insofar as she accepts 
that her sex is tied to extending her family through biological methods. 
The frigid wife is not pathological in the sense that she does not enjoy 
sex; she is not supposed to enjoy sex. She is pathological because her lack of 
desire for sex has turned into an aversion that inhibits or surpasses her 
desire for a baby. There is no liberation from sexual repression. Using 
Foucault’s theories, one can see a woman who is not conforming to 
standards which dictate that she must use her sex to procreate. Because she 
is not willing to perform the reproductive act, her sexual pathology comes 
under the category of frigidity. Likewise for the woman with a masculinity 
complex; she is pathological because the impetus for sexual activity is tied to 
the enjoyment of it. Her desire for sex is rooted in pleasure rather than in her 
desire for the baby-penis. She refuses to let the pleasure from the atrophied 
penis, the clitoris, subside and be replaced by the pleasures derived from the 
possibility of producing a baby-penis. One could, however, argue that the 
diagnosis is attached to the fear that the vagina, which is necessary for 
reproduction will be ignored. If a woman revels in the pleasures of the 
clitoris, she may concentrate on the acts that pleasure it rather than the 
sexual acts that involve the vagina, which is not recognized to feel pleasure. 
The pathological woman is any woman who enjoys or desires sex beyond 
the function of reproduction. Therefore, the danger of sexual pathology 
always surrounds the woman. The normal woman does not gain pleasure 
from the sex act itself but from the desire to propagate. Every time she 
derives pleasure from the sex act, there is a question of feminine pathology. 
Issues of sexual enjoyment keep her in an agitated state. Any moments of 
sexual pleasure serve as dangerous gateways to female pathologies. And 
these female pathologies could have a domino effect on traditional family 
structures that could hurt the greater society and even the species as a 
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whole. Maintaining the status of a normal woman is as much tied to the 
issue of reproduction that fuels bio-power as that of the sexually perverse 
woman. 
Conclusion 
The conceptual framework of psychoanalysis did not offer any cures 
but only techniques to reify standards of normalcy. Applied to female 
sexuality, this means that its techniques are aimed at controlling the 
individual body as well as the greater population. Psychoanalysis does not 
offer a cure.  It is, in short, a mechanism of bio-power. Where Freud traced 
the difficulties women had with their family members (mothers, fathers, and 
later, husbands) to biology, Foucault saw how biology and the traditional 
family structure were enmeshed within the system of bio-power, which 
worked to regulate the female body around life. Their different views on 
‘normal’ sexuality turn on the acceptance or questioning of the primacy of 
science. I interpret Freud as suggesting that anatomy has rendered female 
normalcy difficult to attain and their biological formation leads to the 
problems that they experience with their family members. Otherwise stated, 
biology is the basis for the turbulent female condition. Foucault, on the other 
hand, believes that biology and the traditional family model are shaped and 
supported by bio-power. 
While Foucault’s critique of Freud’s discourse on sexuality can lead to 
resistance of social constructions of woman, he could have also explored 
another path of feminist resistance via Canguilhem.  I suggest that 
Canguilhem’s study of norms problematizes the long-held philosophical 
connection between woman and nature.  If what is normal is that which 
adapts and responds to the environment—as Canguilhem posits, then what 
is normal is also natural.60 Women cannot, therefore, be at once abnormal 
and natural.  That Foucault focuses on how the social rather than the natural 
determines norms is only further evidence that he does not believe that 
politics is not subordinate to a driving force behind life. 
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